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Abstract
A group of experts, for instance climate scientists, is to choose among two
policies f and g. Consider the following decision rule. If all experts agree that the
expected utility of f is higher than the expected utility of g, the unanimity rule
applies, and f is chosen. Otherwise the precautionary principle is implemented and
the policy yielding the highest minimal expected utility is chosen.
This decision rule may lead to time inconsistencies when an intermediate period
of partial resolution of uncertainty is added. We provide axioms that enlarge the
initial group of experts with veto power, which leads to a set of probabilistic beliefs
that is “rectangular” in a minimal sense. This makes this decision rule dynamically
consistent and provides, as a byproduct, a novel behavioral characterization of
rectangularity.
Keywords: Ambiguity Aversion, dynamic consistency, objective rationality,
subjective rationality, full Bayesian updating, rectangularity.
JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D83, D84.
1 Introduction
Consider a board of Bayesian experts that needs to guide choices of a Decision Maker
(DM henceforth) facing alternatives with uncertain outcomes. One can think for instance
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of a group of climate scientists that should advise the European Union about the best
policy in order to fight CO2 emissions. Another concrete and recent example may be
the one of epidemiologists advising a prime minister about the best policy to fight the
Coronavirus outbreak in 2020. In both cases, it is reasonable to think that different
experts assign different probability distributions to possible scenarios. For instance, in
the beginning of March 2020, due to the lack of data and high uncertainty about the
number of infected people, some epidemiologists may have assigned a high probability
to a pandemic scenario with several hundred thousand of contaminated people by the
Coronavirus in all Europe, while at the same time others may have thought that such a
scenario was not as likely to happen.
Suppose that there are two policies f and g under consideration. For instance f is
lockdown the population and g is herd immunity. If all experts think that f is better than
g,1 then it may be reasonable for the DM to prefer policy f rather than g. This decision
rule is sometimes referred to as unanimity principle. Note that all experts in the group
have a veto power: it is sufficient that one expert ranks g above f to break unanimity.
Suppose that this is indeed the case and that experts disagree. Then it is not clear which
policy the DM should implement. In this situation, especially when uncertainty about
different scenarios is high and there are scenarios that can lead to catastrophes, several
authors suggest to adopt the precautionary principle. While there is not an accepted and
universal definition of the precautionary principle, see Gardiner [14], one can think of it
as saying that a policy should be evaluated through the opinion of the most pessimistic
expert.
Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler [18] (GMMS henceforth) offer an ax-
iomatic analysis supporting the use of the precautionary principle in order to “complete”
the unanimity rule when full agreement among experts does not hold. However, if we
introduce an intermediary period of partial resolution of uncertainty, i.e. if experts know
today that they will have some information tomorrow, this decision rule may violate dy-
namic consistency. This means that decisions taken today may be regretted tomorrow
once experts acquire information and are allowed to update their preferences.
This paper provides a refinement of GMMS. Loosely speaking, we show how to enlarge
the group of experts in order to avoid decisions causing future regret. The main idea is
that the board of experts should take into account today the structure of information
describing all events that they might face tomorrow as the actual partial resolution of
uncertainty.
From a decision theoretical point of view, one can identify each expert with the
probability distribution she assigns to possible scenarios (under the assumption that
experts share the same attitude toward risk, i.e. the same affine utility index). Hence the
1When we say “f better than g” we mean that f has an higher expected utility than g.
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term expert and probability measure can be used as synonyms and a board of experts can
be represented by a set of probability measures. Moreover decision rules can be thought
of as preference relations. In this paper the unanimity rule corresponds to a Bewley
preference, see Bewley [3], while the precautionary principle coincides with a Maxmin
preference of Gilboa and Schmeidler [19].
We model information through an exogenous partition of the state space. The ex-
perts may disagree about the probability of any event in the partition but they must
agree that all events in the partition have a positive probability. The DM knows today
that tomorrow she will learn in which element of the partition lies the true state. Our
main result says that the unanimity rule should be modified in order to make the set of
probabilities rectangular with respect to the information partition, in the sense of Sarin
and Wakker [23] and Epstein and Schneider [9]. This is equivalent to expanding the set
of probabilities by considering all new probabilities formed by specific convex combina-
tions of the Bayesian update (with respect to the elements of the partition) of experts’
opinions.
We provide two axioms, Coherence and Prudence, that characterize how the group
of experts should be enlarged in order to obtain a dynamic consistent decision rule.
These axioms are imposed on two Bewley preference relations, %∗ and %∗∗ (and on
their generalized Bayesian updates %∗E and %
∗∗
E ), that correspond to the original and
to the enlarged group of experts respectively. Coherence is divided into two parts: Ex-
Ante and Ex-Post Coherence. Ex-Ante Coherence says, loosely speaking, that the (new)
unconditional preference %∗∗ should agree with %∗ on the likelihood of events in the
information partition. Ex-Post Coherence states that the (new) updated preference %∗∗E
should agree with %∗E . Therefore Coherence imposes some restrictions on how new experts
should be chosen. Prudence simply asserts that the novel unanimity rule will never reveal
a ranking that is not supported by the original criteria. For the representation it implies
that the new set of probability measures should contain the original one. It means that
we may observe new experts added to the original group and all experts that were already
there will still have veto power.
Finally, we require %∗∗ to be the most incomplete preference such that the pair
(%∗ , %∗∗) satisfies Coherence and Prudence. The idea is that we must add as many
experts as possible until the corresponding precautionary completion becomes not subject
to regret, maintaining the coherence and the prudence properties. We call %∗∗ the coher-
ent precautionary restriction of %∗. On the one hand, extending the set of probabilities
means that more opinions are taken into account. On the other hand, it implies that it
is more likely that two experts disagree on the ranking of a pair of acts. Our point here
is that the decrease of comparable acts (i.e. increasing incompleteness of preferences) is
consistent with a DM whose behavior is driven by uncertainty aversion and regret aver-
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sion. Note that an alternative way to solve both the problems of incompleteness and time
inconsistency is to pick only one expert out of the group. Since it seems that there is not
an objective procedure to select the “best expert”, it seems reasonable for a DM to opt
for a plurality of opinions.
Our main result states that given two Bewley preferences %∗ and %∗∗, the relation %∗∗
is the coherent precautionary restriction of %∗ if, and only if, it is a Bewley preference
represented by the same utility index on consequences and with a set of priors that is
the rectangular hull of the set of probabilities characterizing the original preference %∗.
As a corollary, a simple application of GMMS allows us to obtain a dynamic consistent
Maxmin preference as a completion of %∗∗.2 Our results can be interpreted in the follow-
ing way: if a set of expert is not rectangular and if one is willing to safely (i.e. without
generating dynamic inconsistent decisions) complete the unanimity rule by the precau-
tionary principle, then this set should be enlarged through a “rectangularization” a` la
Sarin and Wakker [23] and Epstein and Schneider [9]. Rectangularization implies that in
order to ensure dynamic consistency is enough to consider some convex combinations of
the Bayesian updates of the original probabilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary
notations. Section 3 recalls the results of GMMS and provides an example of dynamic
inconsistency. Section 4 contains our axioms and main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework and Notation
Consider a set S of states of the world, endowed with a σ-algebra Σ of subsets called
events, and a non-empty set X of consequences. We say that a function f : S → X is
simple if f(S) := {f(s) : s ∈ S} is a finite set. A simple function f is Σ-measurable
if {s ∈ S : f(s) = x} ∈ Σ for all x ∈ X . We denote by F the set of all simple and
Σ-measurable functions.
We assume that set of consequences X is a convex subset of a vector space. For
instance, this is the case if X is the set of all simple lotteries on a set of outcomes Z. In
fact, it is the classic setting of Anscombe and Aumann [2] as re-stated by Fishburn [12].
Using the linear structure of X , we can define as usual for every f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1]
the act αf + (1− α)g : S → X by
(αf + (1− α)g)(s) = αf(s) + (1− α)g(s).
Also, given two acts f, g ∈ F and an event E ∈ Σ, we denote by fEg the act delivering
the consequences f (s) in E and g (s) in Ec := S\E (the complement of E).
2Completion means that if two acts cannot be compared by %∗∗, then they should be compared using
the derived Maxmin preference
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We denote by B0(Σ) the set of all simple real-valued Σ-measurable functions a : S →
R. The norm in B0(Σ) is given by ‖a‖∞ = sups∈S |a(s)| (called the sup norm) and
B (Σ) will denote the supnorm closure of B0 (Σ). In another way, B0(Σ) is the vector
generated by the indicator functions of the elements of Σ, endowed with the supnorm
(for more details, see Dunford and Schwarts [6], Section 5 of Chapter IV). We denote by
ba(Σ) the Banach space of all finitely additive set functions on Σ endowed with the total
variation norm. It is isometrically isomorphic to the norm dual of B0(Σ). Note also that
the weak∗ topology σ(ba, B0) of ba(Σ) coincides with the eventwise convergence topology.
Throughout the paper, we assume that any subset of ba(Σ) is endowed with the topology
inherited from the weak∗ topology.
Given a mapping u : X → R, function u(f) : S → R is defined by u(f)(s) =
u(f(s)), for all s ∈ S. We note that u(f) ∈ B0(Σ) whenever f belongs to F . Let x
be a consequence in X , abusing notation we define x ∈ F to be the constant act such
that x(s) = x for all s ∈ S. Hence, we can identify X with the set of constant acts in
F . We say that a function u : X → R is affine if for every f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1],
u(αf + (1 − α)g) = αu(f) + (1 − α)u(g). Affine functions u : X → R are called utility
functions.
We denote by ∆ (S,Σ) := ∆ the set of all (finitely additive) probability measures
P : Σ → [0, 1]. Given an act f ∈ F , a utility index u, and a probability measure
P ∈ ∆, the expected utility of f is denoted by
∫
u (f) dP . Consider an event E ∈ Σ
and a probability P ∈ ∆ such that P (E) > 0. The Bayesian update of P with respect
to E is PE(A) = P (A∩E)
P (E)
. Let C ⊆ ∆ and E ∈ Σ such that P (E) > 0 for all P ∈ C,
then the set CE denotes the set of prior-by-prior Bayesian updates of C given E, i.e.
CE = {PE|P ∈ C}. We also say that C is updated following the full Bayesian rule.
A preference relation %⊆ F × F is a binary relation that satisfies reflexivity, transi-
tivity (preorder), continuity and non-triviality. Continuity means that for all f, g, h ∈ F
the sets {λ ∈ [0, 1]|λf + (1 − λ)g % (-)h} are closed in [0, 1]. Non-triviality means that
% has a non-empty strict part. As usual, the strict and weak parts of % are denoted ≻
and ∼ respectively.
3 Objective and Subjective Rationality and Dynamic
Consistency
This section discusses the interplay between the unanimity rule and the precautionary
principle and the role of dynamic consistency. Section 3.1 recalls the axiomatic analysis of
GMMS in which it is studied how to complete a Bewley preference with a Maxmin pref-
erence. Section 3.2 introduces an intermediate period of partial resolution of uncertainty
and provides an Ellsberg-type example in which dynamic inconsistencies may arise.
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3.1 Completion of a Bewley preference by a Maxmin preference
In the context of social decisions, the unanimity principle postulates that society should
prefer f to g if every individual prefers f to g. Consider a group of individuals (applying
unanimity) in which each member has Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) preferences
with possibly different probability distributions and utility functions. Danan et al. [5]
proposed normative (Pareto) principles in order to aggregate individual preferences into a
unanimity rule in which individuals’ utilities capturing tastes are combined a` la Harsanyi
[20] into one (social) utility function on consequences. This means that it is as if society
is represented by one DM with a Bewley [3] preference in which the set of probability
distributions is characterized by the convex hull of the subjective priors of the members.3
Formally, let u : X → R be a utility function and C ⊆ ∆ be a nonempty, convex, and
σ(ba, B0)-compact subset of ∆. We say that %
∗ is a Bewley preference represented by
(u, C) if for all f, g ∈ F
f %∗ g ⇔
∫
u(f)dP ≥
∫
u(g)dP ∀P ∈ C, (1)
The criterion (1), axiomatized by Bewley [3], says that f is preferred to g with respect
to the preference %∗ if and only if the expected utility of f is higher than the expected
utility of g according to every probability P ∈ C. If every probability distribution in C
represents the opinion of an expert then f is better than g if and only if every expert
ranks f above g. This justifies the name unanimity rule: experts should all agree.
In general this decision rule is incomplete, i.e. does not rank every pair f, g ∈ F . It
may happen that there are P1, P2 ∈ C such that
∫
u(f)dP1 >
∫
u(g)dP1 and
∫
u(g)dP2 >∫
u(f)dP2.
4 If two acts cannot be compared, but a decision must be taken, then several
authors have suggested to use the precautionary principle, or Maxmin, see for instance
Gardiner [14]. This principle states that f is better than g if and only if the minimum
expected utility of f is higher that the minimum expected utility of g, where the minimum
is considered over all probabilities in a set C.
Put formally, if u : X → R is a utility function and C ⊆ ∆ a nonempty, convex, and
σ(ba, B0)-compact subset of ∆, then %
# is a Maxmin preference represented by (u, C) if
for all f, g ∈ F
f %# g ⇔ min
P∈C
∫
u(f)dP ≥ min
P∈C
∫
u(g)dP. (2)
Maxmin has been introduced by Wald [24] in statistical decision theory and it has been
axiomatized in our framework by Gilboa and Schmeidler [19]. It is easy to see that the
3This can be viewed as an application of Theorem 2 of Danan et al. [5]. Their results are actually
more general as each preference of the group members can be itself a Bewley preference.
4Note that all probabilities, and hence all experts have the same importance. One can generalize this
decision rule assigning different weights to different experts as in Faro [10].
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preference relation %# represented by (2) is complete, i.e. it allows to compare every f
and g.
GMMS analyze the interplay between a Bewley preference %∗ and a complete pref-
erence %# (note that in our definition of preference relation in Section 2 completeness
is not required). In GMMS, %∗ represents the objective rationality of the DM: the DM
can convince others that f is better than g in an uncontroversial way. The preference
%# represents the subjective rationality of the DM: the DM cannot be convinced of being
wrong choosing f rather than g (the DM does not feel embarrassed after her choice).
GMMS study under which conditions %# is a Maxmin preference that can be used to
compare acts that are not comparable with respect to %∗. They impose two axioms on
the couple (%∗,%#).
Consistency For all f, g ∈ F , f %∗ g implies f %# g
Default to Certainty For all f ∈ F and x ∈ X , if not f %∗ x then x ≻# f .
Consistency says that the decision rule %# agrees with %∗ whenever acts are com-
parable. In the spirit of GMMS, if it is objectively rational to prefer f to g, then it is
subjectively rational too. Consistency implies that the preference %# is a completion of
%∗, meaning that %# is complete and %∗⊆%#. Default to certainty says that if there is
not a unanimous agreement about the comparison between act f ∈ F and x ∈ X , then
%# should rank the constant x above the uncertain act f .
Theorem 1. [GMMS, Theorem 4] Let %∗ be a Bewley preference represented by (u, C)
and let %# be a complete preference relation. Then:
(i) The pair (%∗,%#) jointly satisfies Consistency and Default to Certainty;
(ii) %# is a Maxmin preference represented by (u, C).
3.2 Dynamic (in)Consistency
The framework of Section 3.1 is static. It does not take into consideration how a DM
would react to new information that could be obtained over time. Let us add an inter-
mediate period of partial resolution of uncertainty.
Let P = {E1, . . . , En} denote a finite partition of measurable events of S, i.e.,
E1, ..., En ∈ Σ, S = ∪
n
i=1Ei and Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ for i 6= j. P denotes the structure of
information, i.e. the DM knows today that tomorrow she will learn that s ∈ Ei for some
i = 1, . . . , n.
Consider a DM with a (unconditional or ex-ante) preference relation % over F . Given
E ∈ P, we call %E the conditional (or ex-post) preference given E. It is interpreted as
the preference of the DM once she knows s ∈ E.
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The following axiom, called Dynamic Consistency is well known in the literature and
relates the unconditional preference % to the conditional preference %E .
Dynamic Consistency For all f, g ∈ F and E ∈ P, f %E g ⇔ fEg % g
The axiom says that f is better than g conditional on E if and only if whenever one
replaces act g with act f on E, the resulting act fEg is better than g. We refer the
reader to Ghirardato [15] for a detailed interpretation of this property.
A second standard axiom well known in the literature is Consequentialism. It says
that a DM should not be concerned about the consequences of an act in states that are
known not to occur. We denote f |E the restriction of act f on event E.
Consequentialism For all f, g ∈ F and E ∈ P, if f |E = g|E, then f ∼E g.
As shown in Faro and Lefort [11], if the couple of preferences (%,%E) satisfies Dynamic
Consistency, then %E satisfies Consequentialism.
Let %∗ be a Bewley preference relation represented by (u, C). Consider an even E ∈ Σ
such that P (E) > 0 for all P ∈ C. Then Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [17] prove
that Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism are equivalent of %∗E being represented
by (u, CE), where CE is the set obtained from C by the full Bayesian updating rule, i.e.
CE = {PE|P ∈ C} and PE(·) = P (· ∩E)
P (E)
. The issue about the equivalence between dynamic
consistency and the prior-by-prior updating rule in Bewley’s model was also previously
discussed by Bewley [4] and Epstein and Le Breton [8].
Note that the conditional preference %∗E is in general incomplete. If one is willing
to directly use Theorem 1 in order to complete it with a Maxmin preference %#E repre-
sented by (u, CE), then possible dynamic inconsistency may arise. Consider the following
dynamic Ellsberg [7] example.5
Example 1. One of the main summary statistics in climate change science is the equilib-
rium climate sensitivity. It denotes the equilibrium increase in global mean temperatures
that would occur if the concentration of atmospheric CO2 were doubled. Uncertainty about
estimates of this parameter is high. See Figure 1 in Meinshausen el al. [21] in which are
plotted estimated probability density functions for climate sensitivity from several pub-
lished studies. Consider the following simple example. There are three possible future
scenarios: low, medium and high climate sensitivity. A group of experts, with the same
attitude toward risk (i.e. same u(·)), knows that the probability P (low) = 1
3
, while they
have no information about P (medium) and P (high). Therefore experts can be identified
with the set
C =
{
P = (p1, p2, p3) ∈ ∆|p1 =
1
3
, p2 ∈
[
0,
2
3
]}
.
5This example is inspired by Example 1 in Ghirardato et al. [17]. Ghirardato et al. [17] acknowledge
that they owe the example to Denis Bouyssou.
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This example is formally equivalent to an Ellsberg urn containing 90 balls, 30 of which
are red, while the remaining 60 are either blue or green. Let us denote low, medium and
high by R, B and G respectively. Suppose that a government has to choose between the
two policies in the table below.
Red Blue Green
f 10 0 10
g 0 10 10
Note that f and g are not comparable with respect to a Bewley preference represented by
(u, C). Consider for instance P1 =
(
1
3
, 0, 2
3
)
and P2 =
(
1
3
, 2
3
, 0
)
. Suppose w.l.g. u(0) = 0,
then
∫
u(f)dP1 = u(10) >
2
3
u(10) =
∫
u(g)dP1 and
∫
u(f)dP2 =
1
3
u(10) < 2
3
u(10) =∫
u(g)dP2. If we use a Maxmin preference in order to compare the two acts we get
min
P∈C
∫
u(f)dP =
1
3
u(10) <
2
3
u(10) = min
P∈C
∫
u(g)dP
i.e. g ≻# f .
Let us add an intermediary period of partial resolution of uncertainty. Information is
modeled through the partition
P = {G,RB}.
Suppose that the experts update the probabilities in C with the full Bayesian rule. In
our example one has CG = {(0, 0, 1)}, i.e. experts know that the true state is G,6 and
CRB = {(p1, p2, 0) ∈ ∆|p1 ∈
[
1
3
, 1
]
}. This results from PRB(R) = P (R)
P (R)+P (B)
=
1
3
1
3
+P (B)
.
By Consequentialism we obtain f ∼∗G g, but again f and g are not comparable with
respect the Bewley preference %∗RB represented by (u, C
RB) (consider for instance Q1 =
(1, 0, 0) and Q2 =
(
1
3
, 2
3
, 0
)
). Suppose that one wants to complete %∗RB with a Maxmin
preference %#RB represented by (u, C
RB). Then
min
P∈CRB
∫
u(f)dP =
1
3
u(10) > 0 = min
P∈CRB
∫
u(g)dP
i.e. f ≻#RB g. Note however that gRBf = g ≻
# f would imply g ≻#RB f if Dynamic
Consistency were to hold. In general using prior-by-prior updating and then applying
Theorem 1 violates Dynamic Consistency.
An axiomatization for the full Bayesian updating in the model of objective and sub-
jective rationality has been proposed by Faro and Lefort [11] in a framework without
the inclusion of a partition in the primitives. In their work, dynamic inconsistencies are
allowed and interpreted as a product of what they call forced choices (decisions that
6For sake of simplicity we are considering full Bayesian updating even if there is P ∈ C with P (G) = 0.
It is easy to modify the example to avoid this possibility (for instance choosing p2 ∈ [0, 2/3) in C).
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must be made and based only on subjective grounds). In the perspective of this paper,
Dynamic Consistency is viewed as a property of preferences fundamentally related to ra-
tionality. If a preference relation is not dynamic consistent then we may have f ≻ g but
g ≻E f and g ≻Ec f .
7 This means that for dynamic inconsistent preferences, decisions
taken today, i.e. choosing f over g, may be regretted tomorrow, i.e. the conditional
preference will rank g above f no matter if s ∈ E or s ∈ Ec. We think therefore that it is
reasonable to require Dynamic Consistency for subjectively rational preferences (defined
in the spirit of GMMS).
It is well known that a Maxmin preference relation %# represented by (u, C) is not
dynamically consistent in general. Epstein and Schneider [9] prove that Dynamic Consis-
tency holds if and only if the set of priors C is rectangular. In Section 4 we show how the
unanimity rule %∗ should be revised in order to achieve a rectangular set and therefore
Dynamic Consistency for the derived Maxmin preference relation.
4 Axioms and main result
Let %∗ be a Bewley preference represented by (u, C). As shown in Example 1, if the
ex-post preference %∗E represented by (u, C
E) is completed by the corresponding Maxmin
preference represented by (u, CE), dynamic inconsistencies may arise. We study here how
%∗ should be transformed into a “new” Bewley preference %∗∗ represented by (uˆ, Cˆ) in
order to avoid those inconsistencies. Without loss of generality, we denote x0 ∈ X an
outcome such that u(x0) = uˆ(x0) = 0.
Given a finite partition P = {E1, · · · , En} ⊆ Σ, such that P (Ei) > 0 for all i ∈
{1, · · · , n} and P ∈ C, we impose the following axioms on the pairs of preferences (%∗
,%∗∗) and (%∗E ,%
∗∗
E )E∈P .
Coherence :
(i) Ex-Ante Coherence. For all x, y ∈ X , for all E ∈ P, y %∗ xEx0 ⇒ y %
∗∗ xEx0
and xEx0 %
∗ y ⇒ xEx0 %
∗∗ y.
(ii) Ex-Post Coherence. For all f, g ∈ F , for all E ∈ P, f %∗E g ⇒ f %
∗∗
E g.
Prudence. For all f, g ∈ F , f %∗∗ g ⇒ f %∗ g.
Coherence imposes some restrictions on the new preference relation %∗∗. Note that
we can interpret an act xEx0 as a bet over E. For instance y %
∗ xEx0 means that
receiving u(y) for sure is preferred to the bet [u(x), P (E); 0, 1 − P (E)] for all P ∈ C.
Ex-Ante Coherence says that %∗∗ should rank bets over events in P as %∗. Ex-Post
7Note that in Example 1 we got g ≻# f but f ≻#
RB
g and f ∼#
G
g (by Consequentialism).
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Coherence simply says that the new conditional preference relation %∗∗E should agree
with %∗E for all E ∈ P. Coherence disciplines the relation between the sets C and Cˆ of
ex-ante probabilities and the sets CE and CˆE of conditional probabilities.
To give an interpretation of Prudence, let us interpret C and Cˆ as sets of (probabilistic)
opinions of a group of experts. Prudence essentially says that we want to “add” experts
to C. This will make %∗∗ more incomplete than %∗, but will insure that more opinions
are taken into account. In the terminology of Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci
[16], %∗∗ reveals more ambiguity than %∗. From their paper it is known that Prudence
implies u = uˆ and C ⊆ Cˆ.
The following definition makes precise how the Bewley preference %∗∗ is built upon
%∗.
Definition 1. Given a finite partition P = {E1, · · · , En} ⊆ Σ, such that P (Ei) > 0 for
all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and P ∈ C, we say %∗∗ is the coherent precautionary restriction (w.r.t.
P) of %∗ if %∗∗ is the most incomplete Bewley preference such that the pair (%∗,%∗∗)
satisfies Coherence and Prudence.
Definition 1 says that not only we want the pair (%∗,%∗∗) to satisfy Coherence and
Prudence, but also we require %∗∗ to be the maximal restriction of %∗ that obeys such
properties (recall that %1 is a restriction of %2 if %1⊆%2. ). Loosely speaking, if we do
not impose this condition, the relation %∗∗ will be subject to the same issues of dynamic
inconsistencies as the original preference %∗ once we take the corresponding completion
with a Maxmin representation.
We can now state our main result.
Theorem 2. Given a finite partition P = {E1, · · · , En} ⊆ Σ, the following assertions
are equivalent:
(i) The preference %∗∗ is the coherent precautionary restriction of %∗;
(ii) For all f, g ∈ F ,
f %∗∗ g ⇔
n∑
i=1
P0(Ei)
∫
u(f)dPEii ≥
n∑
i=1
P0(Ei)
∫
u(g)dPEii , ∀P0, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ C (3)
Expression (3) in Theorem 2 tells how acts should be evaluated by the coherent
precautionary restriction. First one should fix n + 1 probabilities in P0, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ C,
i.e. n+1 experts should be chosen. Each probability Pi, i = 1, . . . , n should be assigned to
a set in the partition P (for simplicity we denote Pi the probability assigned to set Ei).
Then for act f the quantity
∑n
i=1 P0(Ei)
∫
u(f)dPEii should be computed. Expression
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∫
u(f)dPEii is the expected utility of f calculated through the Bayesian update with
respect to Ei of the corresponding probability Pi. Then expected utilities are aggregated
through a convex combinations in which weights are given by P0(Ei). To summarize:
n∑
i=1
P0(Ei)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cvx comb.
∫
u(f)dPEii︸ ︷︷ ︸
EU of f w.r.t.
update P
Ei
i
(4)
The amount in formula (4) should be calculated for all possible n + 1 choices of proba-
bilities in C, for both acts f and g. If for all choices of probabilities the value obtained
for f is higher than the one obtained for g, then f %∗∗ g. This result can be viewed as a
prescriptive way about how to aggregate opinions. A Bewley preference %∗ represented
by (u, C) should be revised in the following way: first, compute the Bayesian update for
all the events in the partition and all members P ∈ C; second, compute the expected
value under these conditional probabilities; and third, take convex combinations using
as weights the opinions of the members on likelihood of events in P. Therefore (3) is
a decision criterion in which new experts acquire veto power. These new experts are
“constructed” from the old ones precisely as we just described.
Given a finite partition P = {E1, · · · , En} ⊆ Σ, it is well known that a probability
Q can be written as Q =
∑n
i=1 P0(Ei)P
Ei
i for some P0, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ C if and only if
Q is in the rectangular hull of C. This notion is formalized in the Definition 2, based
on the previous contributions of Sarin and Wakker [23], Epstein and Schneider [9] and
Ghirardato et al. [17].
Definition 2. Given a partition P = {E1, · · · , En} ⊆ Σ, the rectangular hull of a set of
priors C ⊆ ∆ is given by
rP(C) :=
{
n∑
i=1
P0(Ei) · P
Ei
i : P0, P1, · · · , Pn ∈ C
}
.
We say that a set C ⊆ ∆ is rectangular (w.r.t. P) when C =rP(C).
The rectangular hull of the set C for a partition P is obtained by considering all convex
combinations of the conditional probabilities (conditioned using Bayesian updating on
events in P) with weights given by the unconditional probabilities. The link with (4)
should be evident. Given Definition 2 and Theorem 2 the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1. Item (ii) of Theorem 2 is equivalent to
(iii) For all f, g ∈ F ,
f %∗∗ g ⇔
∫
u(f)dQ ≥
∫
u(g)dQ, ∀Q ∈ rP(C) (5)
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Obviously C ⊆ rP(C), which reflects the fact that the coherent precautionary restric-
tion %∗∗ is a sub-relation of %∗. This comes from Prudence and from Definition 1. If we
want to complete %∗∗ as we did in Section 3.1, an application of Theorem 1 yields the
following result.
Corollary 2. Assume that %∗ is a Bewley preference represented by (u, C). Given a finite
partition P = {E1, · · · , En} ⊆ Σ, let %
∗∗ be the coherent precautionary restriction of %∗
and assume that %## is a complete preference relation. The following are equivalent:
(i) The pair (%∗∗,%##) jointly satisfies Consistency and Default to Certainty;
(ii) %## is a Maxmin preference represented by (u, rP(C)).
Moreover Dynamic Consistency is satisfied and for all E ∈ P, %##E is a Maxmin prefer-
ence represented by (u, rP(C)
E).
The last sentence of Corollary 2 says that Dynamic Consistency is satisfied. This result
is derived from Epstein and Schneider [9], see also Amarante and Siniscalchi [1].8 As we
argued in Section 3.2, Dynamic Consistency is an important property that a subjectively
rational preference should satisfy. Note that Corollary 2 together with Theorem 2 give a
new behavioral characterization of rectangularity and Dynamic Consistency. We conclude
this section with two examples. The first one solves the dynamic inconsistency of Example
1 applying our results. The second one shows how the introduction of an information
partition may increase the perceived ambiguity.
Example 1 - cont. In the Ellsberg example we get that P¯ ∈ rP(C) if and only if there
are P0, P1, P2 ∈ C such that
P¯ (R) = P0(G)P
G
1 (R) + (1− P0(G))P
RB
1 (R) = 0 + (1− P0(G))P
RB
1 (R)
P¯ (B) = P0(G)P
G
1 (B) + (1− P0(G))P
RB
1 (B) = 0 + (1− P0(G))P
RB
1 (B)
P¯ (G) = P0(G)P
G
1 (G) + (1− P0(G))P
RB
1 (G) = P0(G)
Therefore the coherent precautionary restriction %∗∗ is a Bewley preference represented
by (u, rP(C)) with
rP(C) =

(1− t)

00
1

+ t

 p1− p
0

 |t ∈ [1
3
, 1
]
, p ∈
[
1
3
, 1
]
 .
8For a recent application of Dynamic Consistency and rectangularity in a Maxmin model with im-
precise probabilistic information, see Riedl, Tallon and Vergopoulos [22], in which the authors extend to
dynamic settings the model of Gajdos et al. [13].
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Acts f and g are of course not comparable with respect to the Bewley preference %∗∗.
Computing the Maxmin formula obtained by Corollary 2 one gets
I(g) = min
t∈[ 1
3
,1], p∈[1
3
,1]
t(1− p)u(10) + (1− t)u(10) = 0
I(f) = min
t∈[ 1
3
,1], p∈[ 1
3
,1]
tpu(10) + (1− t)u(10) > 0 = I(g)
Hence f ≻## g and no Dynamic Consistency problem will arise once the set rP(C) is
updated with the prior-by-prior Bayes rule, since rP(C)
E = CE for all E ∈ P.
Example 2. Consider an Ellsberg setting as in Example 1 and the following pair of acts
Red Blue Green
f ′ 10 0 0
g 0 10 10
If %∗ is a Bewley preference represented by (u, C) (where C is as in Example 1) it is easy
to show that g ≻∗ f ′. Moreover, one can notice that acts f ′ and g are not ambiguous
with respect to the probability set C, meaning that
∫
u(f)dP =
∫
u(f)dQ for all P,Q ∈ C.
This happens because the events R and BG are not ambiguous. Clearly, if %# denotes a
Maxmin preference represented by the same pair (u, C), one obtains g ≻# f ′. However, if
the information partition is P = {G,RB} there is an increase in ambiguity since P is not
aligned with the ex-ante structure of information given by C. Note actually that f ′ and g
are not comparable with respect to %∗RB and moreover one has f
′ ≻#RB g, where %
∗
RB and
%
#
RB are the ex-post Bewley and Maxmin preferences represented both by (u, C
RB), and
CRB is as in Example 1. This violates Dynamic Consistency. Ghirardato et al. [17] note
“Yet, it seems to us that a decision maker with the ambiguity averse pref-
erences [f ≻ g ≻ f ′] might still prefer to bet on a red ball being extracted,
finding that event less ambiguous than the extraction of a [blue] ball, and that
constraining him to choose otherwise is imposing a strong constraint on the
dynamics of his ambiguity attitude.
In view of this example, we claim that dynamic consistency is a compelling
property only for comparisons of acts that are not affected by the possible pres-
ence of ambiguity. In other words, we think that rankings of acts unaffected
by ambiguity should be dynamically consistent.”
Our approach is complementary to the one of Ghirardato et al. [17]. In order to obtain
Dynamic Consistency of the (uncertainty averse) subjectively rational preference, Corol-
lary 1 says that the coherent precautionary restriction %∗∗ of %∗ should be computed. Acts
f ′ and g are not comparable with respect to %∗∗, as for instance g is ranked higher than
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f ′ for the probability (1
9
, 2
9
, 6
9
) ∈ rP(C) (take p =
1
3
and t = 1
3
) and f ′ is ranked higher
than g for the probability (1, 0, 0) ∈ rP(C) (take p = 1 and t = 1). When the completion
%## (a Maxmin preference represented by (u, rP(C))) is used, we obtain f
′ ≻## g. The
ex-ante ranking is therefore reversed in a way that reflects the increase in ambiguity. This
implies no violations of Dynamic Consistency.
5 Conclusion
The unanimity rule (or equivalently Bewley preference relation) says that a policy (or
equivalently act) f is preferred to g if and only if every expert (or equivalently probability
measure) assigns higher expected utility to f rather than g. If two experts disagree, this
rule is unable to tell which policy is better. When a decision must be taken, several
authors suggest to compare policies through the precautionary principle: the policy with
the highest minimal expected utility should be chosen.
We show that this rule may generate possible dynamic inconsistencies when an inter-
mediary period of partial resolution of uncertainty is added. This implies that choices
made today are regretted tomorrow no matter the additional information learned. In
order to avoid this problem, we provide axioms that modify the original group of experts.
We derive a new unanimity rule called coherent precautionary restriction. New opinions
are formed by taking convex combinations of experts’ updated beliefs. This makes the
completion of the new unanimity rule dynamically consistent.
6 Appendix
Throughout this Appendix, P = {E1 . . . , En} denotes a fixed partition of S. Preferences
%∗ and %∗∗ are Bewley preferences represented by (u, C) and (uˆ, Cˆ) respectively.
Lemma 1. The pair (%∗,%∗∗) satisfies Coherence and Prudence if and only if
(i) uˆ = u;
(ii) Cˆ ⊇ C;
(iii) For all E ∈ P, CE = CˆE;
(iv) For all Q ∈ Cˆ there exists P ∈ C s.t. P (E) = Q(E), for all E ∈ P.
Proof. We focus on the proof of sufficiency, as necessity can be easily proved.
We prove (i), (ii) and (iii). Using Ghirardato el al. [16], Proposition 6, we have that
Prudence implies uˆ = u and Cˆ ⊇ C and Ex-Post Coherence implies CE ⊇ CˆE . Moreover
Cˆ ⊇ C and CE ⊇ CˆE imply CE = CˆE .
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We prove (iv). Suppose by contradiction that there exist Q ∈ Cˆ and E ∈ P such that
Q(E) 6= P (E) for all P ∈ C. Then either Q(E) > P (E) for all P ∈ C, or Q(E) < P (E)
for all P ∈ C. In fact, if for some P1, P2 we have P1(E) > Q(E) > P2(E), then there
exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that Q(E) = αP1(E) + (1 − α)P2(E) and, by convexity of C,
αP1 + (1− α)P2 ∈ C.
Suppose therefore Q(E) > P (E) for all P ∈ C and let P¯ (E) = maxP∈C P (E). Choose
x, y ∈ X such that x ≻∗ x0, y ≻
∗ x0 and
u(x)
u(y)
∈ (P¯ (E), Q(E)). Then u(x)
u(y)
> P¯ (E) and this
implies u(x) > P (E)u(y) for all P ∈ C, i.e. x ≻∗ yEx0. On the other hand
u(x)
u(y)
< Q(E)
implies x 6%∗∗ yEx0, contradicting Ex-Ante Coherence.
Suppose now Q(E) < P (E) for all P ∈ C. Defining P (E) = minP∈C P (E) and reasoning
as before, one gets a contradiction with the second part of Ex-Ante Coherence.
Lemma 2. rP(C) is the maximal set such that
(i) rP(C)
E = CE for all E ∈ P;
(ii) ∀Q ∈ rP(C), ∃P ∈ C such that P (E) = Q(E), ∀E ∈ P.
Proof. We first prove that rP(C) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) and then we show that
it is the maximal set satisfying these conditions.
rP(C) satisfies condition (i). Fix Ej ∈ P. We have P
Ej ∈ rP(C)
Ej if and only if there
exists P ∈ rP(C) such that P
Ej(A) =
P (A∩Ej)
P (Ej)
for all A ∈ Σ. The last assertion holds if
and only if there exists P0, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ C such that
PEj(A) =
P (A ∩ Ej)
P (Ej)
=
∑n
i=1 P0(Ei)P
Ei
i (A ∩ Ej)∑n
i=1 P0(Ei)P
Ei
i (Ej)
= P
Ej
j (A ∩ Ej) = P
Ej
j (A) (6)
for all A ∈ Σ. This implies that PEj ∈ CEj .
On the other hand if P
Ej
j ∈ C
Ej then, choosing n+1 probabilities P0, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ C, (6)
shows that P
Ej
j ∈ rP(C)
Ej .
rP(C) satisfies condition (ii). LetQ ∈ rP(C). Then there are probabilities P0, P1, . . . , Pn ∈
C such that for all Ej ∈ P
Q(Ej) =
n∑
i=1
P0(Ei)P
Ei
i (Ej) = P0(Ej)P
Ej
j (Ej) = P0(Ej).
Hence P0 satisfies condition (ii).
rP(C) is the maximal set satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). Let Q be a probability
over the measurable space (S,Σ) such that QE ∈ CE for all E ∈ P and such that there
exists P ∈ C such that P (E) = Q(E) for all E ∈ P.
For all A ∈ Σ, by the law of total probability we have Q(A) =
∑n
i=1Q(Ei)Q
Ei(A). Since
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QEi ∈ CEi by (i) there is Pi ∈ C such that Q
Ei = PEii . Moreover by condition (ii) there
is P0 ∈ C such that Q(Ei) = P0(Ei). This implies that Q(A) =
∑n
i=1 P0(Ei)P
Ei
i (A) and
hence Q ∈ rP(C).
Proof of Theorem 2. ⇒ Let %∗∗ be a Bewley preference represented by (uˆ, Cˆ). Since
(%∗,%∗∗) satisfies Coherence and Prudence Lemma 1 implies that uˆ = u and Cˆ satisfies
properties (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 1. By Lemma 2, rP(C) is the maximal set
satisfying properties (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 1. By hypothesis, %∗∗ is the most incomplete
Bewley preference such that the pair (%∗,%∗∗) satisfy Coherence and Prudence, hence
Cˆ ⊇ rP(C) and therefore Cˆ = rP(C). This implies the result using Corollary 1.
⇐ By Corollary 1 the representation of %∗∗ implies that ∀f, g ∈ F ,
f %∗∗ g ⇔
∫
u(f)dP ≥
∫
u(g)dP, ∀P ∈ rP(C).
It is obvious that properties (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 are satisfied. By Lemma 2, rP(C)
satisfies properties (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 1. Since moreover rP(C) is the maximal set
satisfying these two properties, %∗∗ is the most incomplete Bewley preference such that
the pair (%∗,%∗∗) satisfies Coherence and Prudence.
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